000			02600cam a2200313 i 4500
001			915509093
003			OCoLC
005			20200617101704.0
008			150803s2016 enka b 001 0 eng c
010			_a2015943402
020			_a9780198755333 _qhardback
020			_a0198755333 _qhardback
035			_a(OCoLC)915509093
040			_aBTCTA _beng _erda _cBTCTA _dBDX _dYDXCP _dCDX _dOCLCO _dOCLCQ _dUIU _dINU _dOCLCF _dAUM _dCBY _dJHE _dVGM
050		4	_aBD171 _b.S57 2016
082	0	4	_a121.6/3 _223
100	1		_aSmith, Martin _c(Of University of Edinburgh), _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aBetween probability and certainty : _bwhat justifies belief / _cMartin Smith.
250			_aFirst edition.
300			_axi, 213 pages : _billustrations ; _c22 cm.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 197-206) and index.
505	0		_aAcknowledgements -- Introduction: the risk minimisation conception of justification -- Two epistemic goals -- What justifies belief -- Justification and lotteries -- Multiple premise closure -- Comparative justification -- Protection from error -- Similar worlds, normal worlds -- Introducing degrees -- Refining risk minimisation: the impossibility results -- Bibliography -- Index.
520			_aMartin Smith explores a question central to philosophy - namely, what does it take for a belief to be justified or rational? According to a widespread view, whether one has justification for believing a proposition is determined by how probable that proposition is given one's evidence. In the present book this view is rejected and replaced with another: in order for one to have justification for believing a proposition, one's evidence must normically support it - roughly, one's evidence must make the falsity of that proposition abnormal in the sense of calling for special, independent explanation. This conception of justification bears upon a range of topics in epistemology and beyond, including the relation between justification and knowledge, the force of statistical evidence, the problem of scepticism, the lottery and preface paradoxes, the viability of multiple premise closure, the internalist/externalist debate, the psychology of human reasoning, and the relation between belief and degrees of belief. Ultimately, this way of looking at justification guides us to a new, unfamiliar picture of how we should respond to our evidence and manage our own fallibility. This picture is developed here.
650		0	_aBelief and doubt.
650		0	_aCertainty.
650		0	_aProbabilities _xPhilosophy.
907			_a.b31471687
942			_2ddc _cE-BOOK
999			_c44479 _d44479